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SEAMEN'S DEATH ACTIONS UNDER THE JONES
ACT, DOHSA, AND THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW:
A COMPARISON
Seamen occupy a unique position under maritime law. Admiralty
courts1 accord great deference to seamen who bring suit for employment-
related injuries since seamen are engaged in a hazardous profession.2 As-
surance of protection against the high risk of disabling injury encourages
seamen to undertake the hazardous work.3 If a seaman dies in the course
of employment, provision should be made for his dependents.4 Seamen,
therefore, are "wards of admiralty," 5 and admiralty courts will liberally
grant a seamen or his personal representative a remedy for work-related
injury or death.6
1 Rules or laws relating to ships, shipping and maritime matters are traditionally within
admiralty jurisdiction. Originally the admiral, a naval officer, had authority over matters
within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Presently, only courts have jurisdiction of cases
arising in admiralty. See 1 BENEDICT ON ADmALTY §102, at 7-4 to 7-5 (Rev. 7th Ed. 1974) A
case arises in admiralty when the dispute involves waters publicly navigable which success-
fully aid interstate or foreign commerce. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 233 (1851); Dardar v. State of Louisiana, 322 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (E.D. La.),
aff'd sub nom. Dardar v. Louisiana State Dept. of Hwys, 447 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1971). When
a case is within admiralty jurisdiction, federal maritime law, as opposed to state common
law or statutory law, applies. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953);
1 M. NoRms, 'IHE LAw OF SEAMEN, § 1, at 1 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as M. NORRIS]
(admiralty law derived from ancient customs and rules of shipping, not from common law).
2 See Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4 (1975). Seamen face the perils of the ocean.
Thus, their employers must be solicitous of their welfare. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S.
511, 524 (1949) .(Douglas, J., dissenting).
1 421 U.S. at 4; see Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No.
6,047). See also Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas. 426 (C.C.D. Mass 1842)(No. 11,641).
4 See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 577 (1974)(courts grant "special
solicitude" for deceased seamen's dependents). See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 688, 761-767 (1976).
' See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942). The master-seaman
relationship differs from the ordinary employer-employee relationship defined in agency
law. The seaman must obey the command of his master without hesitation or argument. See
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 38 (1942); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288
(1897). Thus, the relationship places the master in loco parentis to the seaman, making the
employer the legal guardian of the seaman. See The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 247 (1904);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. at 287; Murphy v. American Barge Line Co., 169 F.2d 61, 64
(3d Cir. 1948). See generally Petition of Den Norske Amerikalisje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163,
171-72 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REV.
479 (1954).
' ;See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970); The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865)
(No. 12,578)(unless otherwise required by established, prophylactic rules, courts should
grant remedy consistent with humane and liberal nature of admiralty proceedings).
Maritime law has always shown a special solicitude for seamen who undertake hazardous
and unpredictable sea voyages. Whether a seaman dies in United States waters or on the
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To implement the humanitarian objectives of admiralty law, admiralty
courts and Congress strive to provide uniformity in seamen's actions.7 In
1920, Congress supplemented the general maritime law8 through the en-
actment of the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act)9 and the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA),10 thus expanding and unifying seamen's actions.
Under general maritime law, which applies in the absence of a specific
controlling statute," injured seamen may bring an action against a vessel
owner for maintenance, cure, and lost wages.1 2 The right to a living allow-
ance, medical expenses, and continuation of salary during a seaman's pe-
riod of convalescence exists regardless of the fault of the shipowner or the
place of the injury."8 Until 1970, however, the general maritime law
high seas has no rational relation to the reasons for allowing the seaman's family to recover
damages for his death. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96, 405
(1970).
7 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 401-02 (1978); S. REP. No.
216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1919) (DOHSA enacted to make federal admiralty law uni-
form). Congress determines the maritime law which will prevail throughout the United
States. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). The Supreme Court has de-
clared that admiralty legislation, when unrelated to matters of a more restricted field, shall
operate uniformly throughout the country. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375,
386-87 (1924). See also The Lottawana, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1875) (framers aware
of international nature of admiralty law and intended admiralty law to be uniform when
granting federal courts power to adjudicate admiralty cases under Article 3, § 2 of the Con-
stitution). Courts, however, may modify admiralty law in keeping with changing circum-
stances. See Cain v. Alpha S.S. Corp., 35 F.2d 717, 722 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 642
(1930). See generally Swain, Requiem for Moragne: The New Uniformity, 25 Lov. L. Rav. 1,
3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Swain].
6 General maritime law is the international law of the sea. See The Lottawana, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 558, 573 (1875).
9 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act grants a seaman the right to recover damages
for injury due to his employer's negligence. If the seaman dies, his personal representative
may maintain a survival action for the seaman's death. In either case, the plaintiff has the
right to trial by jury. See text accompanying notes 56-74 infra. See generally 1B BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY § 2, at 1-12 (Rev. 7th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1B BENEDIrCT]; 2 M.
NORRIS, supra note 1, § 657-704.
10 46 U.S.C. § 761-767 (1976). DOHSA grants a cause of action in admiralty for the
death of a person or seaman due to a shipowner's negligence or for a seaman's death due to
a vessel's unseaworthiness occurring outside of United States waters. See text accompanying
notes 40-52 infra. See generally 2 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, §§ 650-656.
1 M. NORRIS, supra note 1, § 3, at 5.
2 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543 (1960); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158, 175 (1903). "Maintenance" is sustenance, including food and lodging, which the ship
otherwise would be obliged to supply the seaman. See The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831, 835 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 647 (1917). "Cure" is charge or care of the seaman, including
medical expenses, to the extent that cure is possible. See The Atlantic, 2 F. Cas. 121, 131
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 620). "Wages" are the salary of the seaman for the duration of the
voyage. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 520 (1949). The traditional right to main-
tenance, cure, and wages still exists today. E.g., Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048,
1050-51 (1st Cir. 1973).
13 See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938); H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW
OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-2, at 6, § 1-4, at 20 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as H. BAER].
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granted no wrongful death cause of action.14 If a seaman died, his per-
sonal representative's right to bring a wrongful death action existed only
under the Jones Act if the death was caused by the shipowner's negli-
gence; DOHSA if the death was caused by the shipowner's negligence or
the ship's unseaworthiness'" outside of territorial waters; 6 or state wrong-
ful death acts if the death was caused by negligence or unseaworthiness
inside territorial waters. "
The absence of a general maritime law cause of action for wrongful
death resulted in three anomalies. 81 First, identical wrongful conduct on
the part of a shipowner produced liability if the conduct caused injury,
but frequently not if the conduct caused death.29 Second, DOHSA
granted a wrongful death cause of action for deaths occurring outside of
territorial waters as a result of unseaworthiness, while no such cause of
action existed for deaths occurring within territorial waters if the applica-
ble state statute did not recognize unseaworthiness as an actionable
claim.20 Third, the personal representative of a seaman covered by the
Jones Act could not recover for the seaman's death due to unseaworthi-
ness in territorial waters, while a harborworker's personal representative
did have such a right to recovery when allowed by a state statute.
2 1
See generally 2 M. NoRmus, supra note 1, §§ 538-611.
'4 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 379-80, 380 n.3 (1970); The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886). The Supreme Court formerly refused to grant an ac-
tion for wrongful death under general maritime law because the Court reasoned that a per-
sonal cause of action died with the person in the absence of statute. See 119 U.S. at 213-14.
,5 The condition of unseaworthiness exists when,a shipowner fails to supply a reason-
ably fit vessel and appurtenances. Id. at 550. Although the ship need not be accident-free,
the owner absolutely warrants the seaworthiness of the ship to seamen under general mari-
time law, independent of the owner's common law duty to exercise reasonable care. Id. at
549.
Unseaworthiness encompasses more than a dangerous ship or defective equipment. See
generally 1B BENEDIc T, supra note 9, § 23, at 3-45 to 3-46. The quality or quantity of the
ship's personnel may render the ship unseaworthy. See, e.g., Waldron v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 386 U.S. 724, 728 (1967); Walter v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191, 193-
94 (2d Cir. 1962); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1955). Operational
negligence, or "instantaneous unseaworthiness," however, does not render the owner liable
for unseaworthiness. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971); 1B
BENEDI T, supra note 9, § 21, at 3-4; see Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752,
757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962) (ship seaworthy as to seamen injured by
falling glass broken by negligent seaman, but unseaworthy as to seaman who steps on glass).
Also, the mere occurrence of an accident does not alone prove unseaworthiness. E.g., Brown
v. Dravo Corp., 258 F.2d 704, 706 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 960 (1959); Tanzi v.
Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-Gecellschaft Havsa, 355 F. Sujp. 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
0 A distance of more than three miles from the shore of the United States is "outside
of territorial limits". See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 620 (1978).
1" See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 377, 393 (1970); 46 U.S.C. §§
688, 761-767 (1976).
18 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
Is Id. at 395.
20 Id.
" Id. at 395-96.
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The Supreme Court condemned the inequities and lack of uniformity
in wrongful death claims caused by the absence of a general maritime law
death remedy, and ruled in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,22 that
a cause of action for wrongful death now exists under general maritime
law.2 3 Consequently, a seaman's personal representative has three federal
bases of recovery for the death of the seaman.
A seaman's personal representative suing under the general maritime
law cause of action created in Moragne for wrongful death occurring in or
out of territorial waters must prove that the unseaworthiness of the ship
caused the decedent's death.24 The representative may choose to proceed
in rem against the vessel in federal court"5 or in personam against the
owner in a federal or state court.26 If the representative chooses a federal
forum, the action must be brought in admiralty,27 and admiralty courts
22 398 U.S. 375 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). In Moragne, the
widow and administratrix of a longshoreman killed in the course of employment aboard a
ship in territorial waters brought a wrongful death action for negligence and unseaworthi-
ness. Id. at 376. Under the applicable state statute, the unseaworthiness allegation did not
present an actionable claim. Id. at 377. The widow could not sue under the Jones Act be-
cause the decedent had been a longshoreman. See id. at 376; e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros.,
328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946) (longshoremen or their survivors cannot sue under Jones Act even if
longshoreman's employer also vessel owner). The widow also could not sue under DOHSA
because death occurred in territorial waters. See 398 U.S. at 376.
,1 398 U.S. at 409. The Moragne Court examined the history of the common law rule
which denied a decedent's personal representative a cause of action for the decedents
death. The Court concluded that the common law rule has no applicability to maritime law.
Id. at 381-88. The Court also observed that because all states have wrongful death statutes,
no public policy exists against allowing wrongful death recovery. Id. at 390. Further, the
Court reasoned that because the Jones Act and DOHSA both allow recovery for maritime
deaths, Congress did not oppose the judicial creation of a wrongful death cause of action for
those who would otherwise be without remedy. Id. at 393-95.
2' See id. at 376-409. A personal representative alleging negligence as a cause of a sea-
man's death must bring the negligence claim under either the Jones Act or DOHSA. See
text accompanying notes 45 & 55 infra.
25 See Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 369 (1959). A claimant
possessing a maritime lien may bring an in rem action. A maritime lien is a privileged claim
upon maritime property for service done to the property or for injury caused by the prop-
erty. The Ponzan, 9 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir. 1925); see e.g., Savas v. The S.S. Capt. John C.,
182 F. Supp. 641, 643-44 (E.D. Va. 1960), af/'d sub nom. Savas v. Maria Trading Corp., 285
F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1961). The claimant's lien is against the ship, not the owner, and the
claimant has the right to have the ship sold in a direct proceeding to satisfy the claim. See
The Rupert City, 213 F. 263, 267 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
Only the federal admiralty courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate in rem admiralty
claims. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924); The Moses
Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 430-31 (1866). But see C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 134, 153 (1943) (state court had jurisdiction of forefeiture action in rem for improper
use of fishing net in state navigable coastal waters).
26 See Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 369, 370 (1959); cf.
Madruga v. Superior Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1954) (state court may adjudicate in per-
sonam maritime actions). See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409
(1970); note 46 infra. If the representative chooses a state forum, he cannot bring an in rem
action. See notes 25-26 supra.
27 See Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 370 (1959).
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traditionally sit without a jury.28 The general maritime law provides no
specific time period in which the claimant must file a libel.29 Rather, the
flexible doctrine of laches determines the limitations period.3 0
A successful general maritime law libellant 1 may be entitled to gener-
ous recovery. The court may award pecuniary damages3 2 for loss of the
seaman's support and services,33 and funeral expenses,3 ' as well as non-
pecuniary damages 5 for loss of society.3 6 Contributory negligence37 does
21 See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 17 (1963); Green v. Ross, 481
F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); H. BAER, supra note 13, § 1-11,
at 72. Although admiralty courts traditionally sit without a jury, Congress' has previously
provided for jury trials in admiralty courts. See 5 Stat. 726 (1845). See also The Propeller
Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233, 242-44 (1851) (constitutional for Congress
to provide for jury trials in admiralty courts). The Constitution does not forbid jury trials in
admiralty cases, see Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963), although the
seventh amendment does not require jury trials of admiralty cases. See Waring v. Clarke, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 456, 465 (1847). States may provide the jury trial right. See Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 241 (1942); Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356 (1876).
21 H. BAER, supra note 13, § 1-10, at 69. A "libel" is a complaint in admiralty.
SO Under the doctrine of laches, a plaintiff is barred from bringing an action if his delay
is inexcusable and if the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay. See Gardner v. Pan-
ama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951); Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir.
1966).
31 In admiralty, a "libellant" is a plaintiff.
3 "Pecuniary damages" are the damages incurred by the beneficiaries that are propor-
tionate to the decedent's injury. 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:1, at 103-
04 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as S. SPEsE]. Pecuniary damages exclude "everything
but the loss of money and support." Id. § 3:49, at 308.
" See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943,'948-49 (E.D. La.), af'd,
453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
3' Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584 (1974); see Greene v. Vantage S.S.
Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 141
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
31 "Non-pecuniary damages" may most simply be termed "sentimental damages." See
Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 595 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
36 Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584 (1974); Petition of M/V Elaine
Jones, 513 F.2d 911, 912-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). Loss of society
encompasses the loss that family members endure from the death of another member, in-
cluding love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. 414 U.S. at
585; see Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Ribax,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 974, 979 (M.D. Fla. 1976). In the case of a spouse, loss of society includes
loss of consortium. Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 765 (S.D. Tex. 1977). A
general maritime law libellant may not, however, recover damages for his mental anguish or
grief on account of the decedent's death. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585
n.17; In re S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra
note 32, at § 3:49; Comment, Loss of Consortium in Admiralty: A Yet Unsettled Question,
1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133. See also American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 100 S. Ct. 1673
(1980).
37 Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff is absolutely barred from
recovery if the plaintiff's own conduct proximately caused his injury, even though the defen-
dant may have breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff which proximately caused the
same injury. 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LIAmmrry & LITIGATION § 4.02, at 78 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as J. DOOLEY].
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not bar recovery under general maritime law. 8 Rather, the principle of
comparative negligence applies, allowing the court to reduce the amount
of recovery by the amount of the decedent's own negligence3s
In contrast to the liberal provisions of general maritime law, DOHSA °
provisions are markedly limited. DOHSA applies only to persons who
die 4 1 outside of the territorial limits of the United States, or on the "high
seas". 42 Under DOHSA, the decedent's personal representative can only
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1939). The assumption of
risk doctrine is also inapplicable in seamen's actions. Id. There are cogent reasons for denial
of the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. A seaman risks loss of
pay and desertion penalties if he abandons ship because working conditions are unsafe. If
the seaman complains about working conditions, his superiors are likely to take a dim view
of his complaints. Moreover, a seaman often has little opportunity or capacity to weigh the
consequences of his actions in the course of employment. Id. at 430-31. See also note 5
supra.
39 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. at 431. Under the comparative negligence
doctrine, a court compares the fault of the plaintiff with that of the defendant, permitting
recovery despite the plaintiff's negligence, reduced by the proportion that the plaintiff's neg-
ligence contributed to the injury. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 32, § 5:10, at 605; Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 465 n.2 (1953). See generally Mole & Wil-
son, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 339-50 (1932); 1B BENEDICT,
supra note 9, § 25, at 3-104 to 3-117. State law provisions cannot modify the comparative
negligence rule since maritime torts are controlled by federal maritime law. See Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953).
40 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1976); see note 10 supra.
41 DOHSA is not limited to seamen. See 46 U.S.C. § 761 (personal representative may
sue for person's wrongfully caused death); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375, 407-08 (1970); e.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (DOHSA action for death of passengers). DOHSA deals specifi-
cally and exclusively with wrongful death actions. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, 407 (1970).
42 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976); see, e.g., The Buenos Aires, 5 F.2d 425, 426 (2d Cir. 1924)
(ship collision at sea). Death arising from a wrongful act occurring over the high seas is
within DOHSA. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 619 (1978) (decedents
killed in helicopter crash outside territorial limits); D'Aleman v. Pan Am World Airlines,
Inc., 259 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 1958) (decedent went into shock when told by pilot of plane
outside territorial limits that plane in danger). But see Lowe v. Trans World Air-Lines, Inc.,
396 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (deaths over high seas from explosion of bomb
planted while plane on land not necessarily within DOHSA). DOHSA may be applicable
even if the tort's inception was within territorial limits as long as the wrongful act or omis-
sion had suit-producing impact on the high seas. See, e.g., Lavello v. Danko, 175 F. Supp.
92, 93 & n.* (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Noel v. Airponents, 169 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D. N.J. 1958). But
see Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 538, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)(no DOHSA
jurisdiction where decedent died in plane crash within territorial limits and decedent suf-
fered no injury contributing to death while outside territorial limits, even if negligence com-
mitted on high seas caused plane crash).
DOHSA does not apply to death-causing torts occurring on the Great Lakes, inland
waterways within state territorial limits, or navigable waters within the Panama Canal Zone.
46 U.S.C. § 767 (1976); see Turner v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 242 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir.
1957). DOHSA is also inapplicable to deaths occurring on artificial island drilling riggs lo-
cated outside territorial limits. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365-66
(1969); see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976); 395 U.S. at 360-61; Bertrand v. Shell Oil Co., 489
F.2d 293, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1973).
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sue on behalf of the decedent's spouse, parents, children, or dependent
relatives. s The representative must prove that the defendant's "wrongful
act, neglect, or default" caused the decedent's death.44 The basis of a
DOHSA recovery is unseaworthiness, in the case of a seaman, or negli-
gence in the case of a person, including a seaman.45 Either a federal admi-
ralty court" or a state court4V7 may take jurisdiction of the action, which
the personal representative may bring in rem or in personam.S'SA suit
under DOHSA is barred unless the libellant files a libel within two years
from the date of the death causing act.
49
43 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). Since a DOHSA action is not a survival action, the personal
representative can only maintain the action if the beneficiaries specified in § 761 exist. See
note 56 infra, e.g., Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 560, 561 (D. Mass.
1950).
14 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
" See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970); Kernan v.
American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958); 2 BENEDIT ON ADMInALTY, § 81, at 7-5
n.15 (Rev. 7th ed. 1975); Note, 53 TuL. L. Rav. 254, 257 n.21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TUL. L. Rav.]. Only seamen have a DOHSA cause of action for unseaworthiness. E.g., Gib-
boney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 100 (1946) (non-seaman aboard vessel doing work traditionally done by seaman
entitled to seaworthiness warranty). Passengers are not seamen; therefore, a shipowner does
not warrant the seaworthiness of a vessel to passengers. See, e.g., In re Companie Generale
Transatlantique, 392 F. Supp. 973, 975 (D. P.R; 1975). The shipowner, however, owes pas-
sengers the highest degree of care and diligence. Id. See also Talton v. United States Lines
Co., 203 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The duty of care and diligence is unlike the duty
to provide a seaworthy ship, since due diligence will not satisfy the absolute warranty of
seaworthiness. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 399 (1970). Some
courts have erroneously assumed that the seaworthiness warranty extends to passengers.
See, e.g., In re Wood, 145 F. Supp. 848, 855-56 (W.D. Mo. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Loc-Wood
Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957). See generally note 15 supra.
46 See 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976); e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 318 F.2d 710,
711 (2d Cir. 1963); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
352 U.S. 802 (1956).
,7E.g., Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 261, 219 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247, 176
N.E.2d 820, 821 (1961). Contra, e.g., Boudreau v. Boat Andrea G. Corp., 350 Mass. 473, -,
215 N.E.2d 907, 908-09 (1966). While 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) provides that the federal
courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil admiralty and maritime claims, that
statute does not require that only federal courts may try admiralty cases. Only federal
courts can exercise the powers of admiralty courts when trying admiralty cases. 1 M. NOR-
R15, supra note 1, § 4, at 8. For example, state courts cannot exercise admiralty in rem
jurisdiction. See note 25 supra. However, under the Savings to Suitors Clause of § 1333(1), a
litigant with an in personam admiralty claim has the option to sue in a state court if he
meets that court's jurisdictional requirements. The remedy that the state court may grant is
a remedy over which common law and admiralty courts had concurrent jurisdiction when
the Constitution was adopted. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 456, 466 (1847); 1 M.
NoRMs, supra note 1, § 4, at 8-9.
48 See 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976); note 25 supra.
41 Id. § 763; see Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489, 491 (D. Mass. 1962).
Courts may grant an exception to the two-year statute of limitations period if the plain-
tiff has had no reasonable opportunity to obtain jurisdiction over the potential defendant.
The cause of action becomes barred, however, at the expiration of 90 days after the plaintiff
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DOHSA damages are limited to pecuniary losses suffered by the bene-
ficiaries,50 and these damages cannot be supplemented by general mari-
time law.51 Recovery cannot be decreased except upon application of the
comparative negligence doctrine.
52
The federal personal injury statute specifically restricted to seamen is
the Jones Act." The Jones Act allows a seaman" to maintain an action
has been offered a reasonable opportunity to secure jurisdiction. 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1976).
46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976); see, e.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 786 (5th Cir. 1976)
(pecuniary loss is monetary benefits which could have been generated over decedents nor-
mal life span). The court may also assess pre-judgment or moratory interest from the date
of the decedent's death. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 594 (2d
Cir. 1961). A DOHSA libellant may not recover damages for funeral expenses, e.g., The
Culberson, 61 F.2d 194, 195 (3d Cir. 1932), conscious pain and suffering of the decedent
prior to death, e.g., Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D. Mass.
1962), or loss of society. E.g., First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National Airlines, Inc., 288
F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961).
" Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978).
52 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976). See generally note 39 supra.
53 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act provides that a seaman's personal representa-
tive may maintain an action in cases where the seaman dies as a result of injuries for which
the seaman could bring action under the statute. See id. Thus, the Jones Act provides a
survival action, as opposed to a wrongful death action. A survival action is maintained for
the damages the deceased could have recovered had he lived. A wrongful death action is for
harm suffered by the beneficiaries of the suit as a result of the seaman's death. Swain, supra
note 7, at 3; see Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974).
" The Jones Act does not define the term "seaman." See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Under
46 U.S.C. § 713 (1976), a seaman is defined as an employee engaged to serve in any job on
any United States citizen's vessel. The § 713 definition of a seaman, however, is not part of
the Jones Act. See Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 160-62 (1934). The term "seaman" is
flexible, and in suits under the Jones Act the term is given a broad and liberal meaning. See,
e.g., Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 372, 374 (1957). To qualify as a "sea-
man," a person must be permanently assigned to a vessel or perform a substantial part of
his work on a vessel. The capacity in which the person is employed or the work that he does
must contribute to the vessel's functioning, accomplishment of the vessel's mission, or oper-
ation or welfare in terms of the vessel's maintenance during movement or during anchorage
for future trips. Davis v. Hill Eng'r, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Offshore
Drilling Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959)); see, e.g., Swanson v. Marra
Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946) (vessel's crew members are seamen); Keefe v. Matson Nay.
Co., 46 F.2d 123, 123 (W.D. Wash, 1930) (on-board telephone operator is seaman); Taylor v.
Packer Diving & Salvage Co., 342 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 512 (5th
Cir. 1972) (divers are seamen); Neville v. American Barge Line Co., 105 F. Supp. 408, 411
(W.D. Pa. 1952) (laundress is seaman). Compare Cox y. Otis Eng'r Corp., 474 F.2d 613, 613
(5th Cir. 1973) (wireman unassigned to any specific drilling barge who only performed work
on vessel for two days not seaman); Labit v. Carey Salt Co., 421 F.2d 1333, 1334-35 (5th Cir.
1970) (worker employed by salt company to load vessels with salt by conveyor belt not sea-
man); Whittington v. Sewer Constr., 367 F. Supp. 1328, 1329-30 (S.D. W.Va. 1973) (crane
operator working on bridge demolition not seaman). A seaman's status is not dependent
upon the possession of "seaman's papers." Noble Drilling Corp. v. Smith, 412 F.2d 952, 957
(5th Cir. 1969). Further, a seaman's status does not turn upon the length of the voyage.
George v. The C. & 0. Ry. Co., 348 F. Supp. 283, 286 (E.D. Va. 1972). However, a person
with merely transitory connection with a vessel is not a seaman. Keener v. Transworld Drill-
ing Co., 468 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1972); Mietla v. Warner Co., 387 F. Supp. 937, 938 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
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for injury or a seaman's personal representative to maintain an action for
the seaman's death due to negligence.15 The place of the tort is irrele-
vant" as long as the injury or death occurs within the scope of the sea-
man's employment. 57 Since the provisions of the Jones Act must be read
in conjunction with the provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA),58 a seaman's personal representative -may sue only on behalf of
specified beneficiaries.5 9 As under general maritime law and DOHSA, a
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950
(1976), now provides the exclusive remedy for longshoremen, who previously had been cov-
ered under the Jones Act. See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52
(1926). Since longshoremen serve on vessels as laborers, they are distinguishable from the
vessel's sea-going personnel, who are primarily aboard to aid in navigation. See South Chi-
cago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 260 (1949); Sullivan v. American Pxes. Lines,
Ltd., 206 F. Supp. 547, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Negligence'under the Jones Act differs from unseaworthiness.
See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1930); TuL. L. REV., supra note 45, at 257
n.26 (1978). See also note 24 supra. A shipowner is liable for negligence if he knowingly or
carelessly breaches any duty he owed to the seaman. Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp. Co.,
414 F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 674 (1944); see Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1956)(FELA); Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem., 300
F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1977); Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to actions under the Jones Act. See Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 46, 49 (1948). Literally meaning "the thing speaks for itself," the
doctrine allows an inference of negligence from the facts of an unexplained injury-causing
occurrence when direct evidence of negligence is lacking. See Jesionowski v. Boston & Me.
R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 452, 457 (1947) (FELA); Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913). See
generally Savard v. Marine Contr'g., Inc., 471 F.2d 536,'542-43 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 943 (1973); Olsen -v. State Line, 378 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1967).
58 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1930). The
Jones Act is applicable in domestic waters, e.g., Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, 606 F.2d 524,
525 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2927 (1980), on the high seas, e.g.,
Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. -denied,
429 U.S. 1098 (1977), and in foreign waters. E.g., Farmer v. Standard Dredging Corp., 167 F.
Supp. 381, 384 (D. Del. 1958).
57 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). A Jones Act seaman must be an employee of the defendant to
recover. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949); Williams v.
McAllister Bros., Inc., 534 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1976); Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d
216, 224 (5th Cir. 1975); 2 M. NoRus, supra note 1, § 670, at 308. But see TUL. L. REV.,
supra note 45, at 256 n.19. An employee is within the scope of his employment if he acts at
the request, express or implied, or for the benefit and under the direction of the employer.
J. DOOLEY, supra note 37, § 16.06, at 343-44.
' 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). The FELA provides a remedy for the personal injury of
railway employees, and the Jones Act provides that all federal statutes "modifying or ex-
tending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees"
are applicable. See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Thus the Jones Act incorporates the FELA by
reference. See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 40 (1930); Pafiama R.R. Co. v. John-
son, 264 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1924); Igneri v. Cie de Transport Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
"9 The personal representative of a seaman must sue on behalf of the surviving spouse
and children. If there is no surviving spouse or children, the parents must be the benefi-
ciaries. If there are no living parents, the action may be maintained for the seaman's depen-
dent next of kin. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976); see Bailey v. Baltimore Mail S.S. Co., 43 F. Supp.
243, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); In re Rademaker's Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 208, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309,
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Jones Act claim may be prosecuted in federal or state court.60 The Jones
Act plaintiff has the right, however, to trial by jury in federal court,"1
without fulfilling diversity82 or jurisdictional amount requirements.6 " Un-
like general maritime law and DOHSA libellants, a Jones Act plaintiff
may only proceed against the defendant in personam.64 If the plaintiff
brings the action in federal court against a corporate defendant, venue65
lies in any district where the corporation is licensed to do business or is
doing business.6s The statute of limitations under the Jones Act bars ac-
315-16 (1938). The surviving spouse and minor children need not show actual proof of mon-
etary loss due to the seaman's death unless the spouse and children were living in a state of
unjustifiable separation from him at the time of the death. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tier-
ney, 169 F.2d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 1948); The Erie Lighter 108, 250 F. 490, 498-99 (D. N.J.
1918). Illegitimate children may be beneficiaries. E.g., Hebert v. Petroleum Pipe Inspectors
Corp., 396 F.2d 237, 237 (5th Cir. 1968). The parents of a deceased adult seaman, however,
must allege and prove monetary loss. Garrett v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 235 U.S.
308, 312, 313 (1914) (FELA); see Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959) (parent's
reasonable expectation of future contributions from deceased sufficient). A dependent rela-
tive may be a beneficiary even though the seaman has more closely related nondependent
next of kin. Poff v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 327 U.S. 399, 401 (1946) (FELA). A fiancee is not
a "next of kin" and thus cannot be a Jones Act beneficiary. Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co.,
395 F. Supp. 978, 988 (E.D. La. 1975).
" See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); note 48 supra; H. BAER, supra note 13, § 1-11, at 73.
6 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); H. BAER, supra note 13, § 1-11, at 73. Though not specified in
the Jones Act, the plaintiff may bring suit in admiralty without a jury. See Panama R.R. Co.
v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924).
62 See McCarthy v. Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724, 726-27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
868 (1949); Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Nordyke, 140 F.2d 902, 904, 905 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 760 (1944).
'3 Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 290, 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John The Baptist Bridge & Ferry Auth., 274 F. Supp. 764, 768
(E.D. La. 1967). Contra, Turner v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D.
Mass. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1959); Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 193,
194 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
" Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 155, 156 (1926). A Jones Act suit cannot
be in rem even if brought in admiralty. Id.
65 The Supreme Court has construed the Jones Act term "jurisdiction" to mean
"venue." See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1924). See also 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1976). Jones Act cases arise under United States laws. Congress need not enact a sepa-
rate jurisdictional provision for cases already under the general jurisdiction of the district
courts. 264 U.S. at 383-84. The purpose of the Jones Act "jurisdiction" provision is to pre-
vent defendants from being sued in remote districts. Id. at 384.
66 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204-05 (1966). The Jones Act states that the
plaintiff must sue in the district of the employer's residence or place of principal office. See
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). As under the general federal venue statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(1976), a Jones Act corporate defendant "resides" in any district where the corporation is
licensed to do business or is doing business. 384 U.S. at 204-05. The broad concept of resi-
dence under the Jones Act furthers the intent of Congress, since the Jones Act is not prima-
rily directed at venue, but at providing seamen and their representatives substantive rights
and a federal forum for vindication. Id. at 205, 207.
The Jones Act venue provision does not apply to actions brought in state court. See
Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1926). Whether the provision applies to
claims brought in admiralty in unclear. See Brown v. C.D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98, 102
(3d Cir. 1941); Baliff v. Storm Drilling Co., 356 F. Supp. 309, 311 (E.D. Tex. 1972).
[Vol. XXXVII
1980] SEAMEN'S DEATH ACTIONS 12571
tions not prosecuted within three years of accrual.
67
Pecuniary damages are recoverable in an action brought under the
Jones Act.68 Non-pecuniary damages may also be recovered, since the
Jones Act places no specific restrictions on potential damages.6 9 A Jones
Act plaintiff's recovery may be reduced only under the comparative negli-
gence doctrine. 0
The general maritime law, DOHSA, and the Jones Act collectively
provide liberal sources of recovery to effectuate the humanitarian objec-
tives of admiralty law. A recent Supreme Court decision, however, has
caused confusion in the field of admiralty death actions. In Mobil Oil
Corp. v. HigginbothaM,71 the Supreme Court held that the personal rep-
resentatives of passengers killed on the high seas due to the defendant's
negligence were restricted to recovery for pecuniary damages under
DOHSA.7 2 The Court refused to allow the libellants to recover non-pecu-
A Jones Act defendant may waive venue. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375,
385 (1924).
67 See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 225
n.6 (1958) (Jones Act limitations period three years even though FELA period two years
when Jones Act enacted).
Is See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 324, 347 (1937); Michigan Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68-70 (1913) (FELA); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, 606
F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Pollard v. Seas Shipping Co., 146 F.2d 875, 877-78
-(2d Cir. 1945). Funeral expenses generally are not recoverable. E.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v.
Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968). There is no recovery for loss of society or consor-
tium under the Jones Act. E.g., In re M/V Elaine Jones, 513 F.2d 911, 912-13 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266-
67 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
"' See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); Note, 11 J. MAn. L. & CoM. 139, 144 (1979). But see, e.g.,
Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (plaintiff
can only recover pecuniary damages under Jones Act). The personal representative may
recover damages for the pain and suffering of the decedent prior to death. 45 U.S.C. § 59
(1976); see, e.g., Blanco v. Phoenix Compania de Navegacion, S.A., 304 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir.
1962) ($75,000). Pain and suffering damages may include compensation for worry, fear, and
anxiety. See Deitz v. United States, 228 F.2d 494, 495 (3d Cir. 1955).
70 See 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976); note 39 supra. A court will reduce recovery if a seaman
was even slightly negligent. See, e.g., Fleming v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.
451 F.2d 1329, 1331 (2d Cir. 1971) (seamian who leaned on work table which moved and
caused his injury by sawblade found negligent upon showing that table top had never moved
before). The assumption of risk doctrine does not apply to actions under the Jones Act. See
Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 64 (1943) (FELA amended to remove
assumption of risk defense); Fonsell v. New York Dock Ry., 198 F. Supp. 332, 337 (E.D.N.Y.
1961).
71 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
72 Id. at 619, 625-26. In Higginbotham, the defendant's helicopter crashed outside terri-
torial waters, killing the pilot and three passengers. The personal representatives of the
passengers brought suit, and the district court denied recovery for loss of society, though the
district court valued the loss of society suffered by the families of two passengers at
$100,000 and $155,000. Id. at 619. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, up-
held the judgement of the district court. Id. at 619-20. See generally Maraist, Maritime
Wrongful Death-Higginbotham Reverses Trend and Creates New Questions, 39 LA. L.
REv. 81 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Maraist].
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niary loss of society damages under general maritime law.73 Thus, absent
application of the Jones Act, the representative of a person killed on the
high seas may only recovery under DOHSA.7 4 Higginbotham revives the
territorial distinction rejected by Moragne that non-pecuniary damages
are recoverable if the death occurs within territorial waters, while only
pecuniary damages are recoverable if the death occurs on the high seas. 5
In the wake of Higginbotham, this territorial distinction has been applied
in the case of seamen's deaths due to unseaworthiness.
In Smith v. Ithaca Corp.,76 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit faced the issue of whether damages for loss of society are
recoverable under general maritime law when the general maritime law
claim is joined with claims under DOHSA and the Jones Act.77 The Fifth
Circuit determined that recovery of pecuniary damages for negligence
under the Jones Act does not preclude recovery for non-pecuniary dam-
ages for unseaworthiness under general maritime law.78 The court specifi-
cally held, however, that non-pecuniary damages are recoverable for the
death of a seaman in territorial waters.79 The court also allowed recovery
under DOHSA, but the court affirmed the district court's award of non-
pecuniary damages because such damages are recoverable in territorial
waters.80 The Smith court reasoned that because the record did not show
where the death occurred, unfairness would result if the court denied
non-pecuniary damages where the unseaworthiness occurred in both terri-
torial and non-territorial waters."' The court therefore impliedly held that
recovery for non-pecuniary damages due to unseaworthiness occurring
outside territorial waters is not permissible. Since an unseaworthiness al-
legation is actionable under DOHSA,82 the Fifth Circuit has determined
that after Higginbotham, the personal representative of a seaman killed
on the high seas as a result of unseaworthiness may recover only pecuni-
11 Id. at 625-26. The Higginbotham Court ruled that DOHSA provides the exclusive
remedy for wrongful death on the high seas in cases where DOHSA applies, recognizing that
the remedy for deaths occurring in United States waters may be greater than that author-
ized by DOHSA. Id. at 624. The Court considered itself powerless to prevent the lack of
uniformity caused by its holding since Congress had determined the permissible recovery for
deaths on the high seas by enacting DOHSA. Id. at 625-26.
7, See Christovich, The High Risk of "Sifting"--Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 45
INS. CouNsELs J. 554, 557-58 (1978).
75 See generally TuL. L. Rav., supra note 45.
76 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980). In Smith, the seaman was a member of the crew of a
cargo ship which sailed between Florida and Puerto Rico. The decedent suffered a fatal
heart attack caused by toxic benzene fumes which permeated the ship's living quarters and
exacerbated the seaman's pre-existing heart disorder and arteriosclerosis. Id. at 217.
77 Id. at 216, 225.
78 Id. at 225-26.
7 Id. at 226.
80 Id. at 216-17, 226.
81 Id. at 226.
82 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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ary damages under DOHSA.8 3
The territorial distinction revived by the Higginbotham decision, how-
ever, should not apply to seamen's actions for unseaworthiness. The Hig-
ginbotham Court stated that the general maritime law could not provide
additional recovery where Congress already specifically legislated the per-
missible recovery." DOHSA provides that only pecuniary damages are re-
coverable for death caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default beyond
territorial limits,85 and a seaman's unseaworthiness allegation states a
cause of action under DOHSA.86 In Higginbotham, however, the dece-
dents were not seamen, 7 and their personal representatives sought recov-
ery for negligence, not unseaworthiness. 88 Also, DOHSA is not essentially
'a seamen's act.8 ' A seaman's personal representative may bring an action
for wrongful death occurring outside territorial waters under either
DOHSA or the Jones Act, but the representative certainly is not com-
pelled to sue under DOHSA. Consequently, Congress has not specifically
legislated on the issue of whether a seaman's cause of action for unsea-
worthiness outside territorial waters must be brought under DOHSA.9 A
seaman's personal representative should therefore be allowed to recover
pecuniary damages for negligence under the Jones Act and non-pecuniary
damages under general maritime law, regardless of the place of the tort,
without running afoul of Higginbotham."
s1 Accord Public Adm'r of N.Y. v. Angela Compania Naviera, S.A., 592 F.2d 58, 63 (2d
Cir. 1979).
S4 436 U.S. at 625.
:5 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
88 See text accompanying note 45 supra. See also note 24 supra.
7 See 436 U.S. at 619.
" See id. Since passengers may not allege unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery, see
note 45 supra, the Higginbotham Court could could not have decided whether a seaman's
personal representative alleging unseawortliiness as the cause of death outside of territorial
waters must sue under DOHSA as opposed to general maritime law.
9 Campbell v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 5 F.2d 674, 675 (D. Or. 1925); see In re Dearborn
Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 270 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974); Puamier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F.
Supp. 1019, 1032 & n.6 (E.D. Va. 1974). See also The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399, 400-01
(D. Mass. 1947) (DOHSA gives remedy for additional beneficiaries of seaman not covered by
Jones Act); In re Rademaker's Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 208, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309, 315 (1938) (Jones
Act applies FELA provisions not expressly covered by DOHSA to maritime law, giving addi-
tional coverage if death occurs within territorial waters or where injury not fatal).
"But see, e.g., Maraist, supra note 72.
' In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1965), the Court held that a
wrongful death claim based on unseaworthiness could not be joined with a Jones Act claim.
Id. at 154-55. The Gillespie decision, however, dealt with an unseaworthiness allegation
under a state statute. Moreover, no federal wrongful death cause of action existed when
Gillespie .was decided. Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 978, 984-85 (E.D. La.
1975). Hence, a personal representative may join an unseaworthiness claim under general
maritime law with a Jones Act claim. Id. at 984-85. Similarly, a plaintiff may join an unsea-
worthiness claim under DOHSA with his Jones Act negligence claim. See, e.g., Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker, 367 F.2d 465, 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1966); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F.
Supp. 978, 985 (E.D. La. 1975). The plaintiff, however, would only be entitled to pecuniary
damages on the unseaworthiness claim. See text accompanying note 50 supra. Also, the
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While the general maritime law, DOHSA, and the Jones Act all grant
causes of action for wrongful death, only the Jones Act confers the right
to a jury trial.92 Therefore, a representative with a claim for the negli-
gently-caused death of a seaman-employee could prefer to sue under the
Jones Act rather than under DOHSA. If the representative's claim is
based on unseaworthiness, however, the representative has no chance of
getting a jury trial unless diversity and jurisdictional amount require-
ments in federal court are satisfied 9s or unless the action is brought in a
state court which will grant a jury trial.9 4 A representative, then, must
plan his strategy in order to take advantage of the Jones Act jury trial
right. The simplest way for a deceased seaman's personal representative
to obtain a jury trial for an unseaworthiness claim is to join that claim
with a Jones Act negligence claim.95 Allowance of such joinder helps pre-
serve uniformity in seamen's actions.
A personal representative bringing an action for the death of a seaman
has the benefit of the humanitarian policy of admiralty.96 The representa-
tive may be entitled to sue under one or more of three federal causes of
action for seamen's deaths.97 Pecuniary damages for deaths due to negli-
gence or unseaworthiness are recoverable regardless of the place of the
tort.9 ' Notwithstanding the interpretation given the Higginbotham deci-
sion by some courts, non-pecuniary damages for seamen's deaths due to
unseaworthiness should likewise be recoverable without regard to the
place of death.99 Finally, the representative may enhance the possibilities
DOHSA two year limitations period is more stringent than the doctrine of laches under
general maritime law. See text accompanying notes 30 & 49 supra.
" See text accompanying note 61 supra.
'3 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Angela Companie Naviera, S.A., 417 F. Supp. 151, 153-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also text accompanying notes 24, 28, 45 & 46 supra.
See note 30 supra.
" See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 18-19, 21 (1963); H. BAER, supra
note 14, § 1-11, at 74-75. A plaintiff can also join a Jones Act negligence. claim with a
DOHSA unseaworthiness claim and get a jury trial as to both claims. See Peace v. Fidalgo
Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1969); Gvirtsman v. Western King Co., 263
F. Supp. 633, 634-35 (C.D. Cal. 1966). An unseaworthiness claim under DOHSA, however,
has disadvantages. See note 91 supra. Negligence is harder to prove than unseaworthiness,
since the plaintiff alleging negligence must show lack of due care on the part of the ship-
owner. Compare note 55 with note 24 supra. There are some instances, however, when a
negligence claim may provide a personal representative with a better chance for recovery
than an unseaworthiness claim. A Jones Act defendant may be liable for non-compliance
with any statute or regulation which was the proximate cause of the death, regardless of
whether the statute or regulation was designed for the seaman's safety. See 45 U.S.C. § 54
(1976) (FELA). The Jones Act allows recovery even when an intervening cause directly
caused the seaman's death, while this is not true for unseaworthiness claims. Also, an unsea-
worthiness claim will not succeed if operational negligence has occurred. 1B BEaNDar,
supra note 9, § 21, at 3-3 to 3-4; see note 24 supra.
See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra
See text accompanying notes 24-70 supra.
See text accompanying notes 33-34, 50 & 68 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-91 supra.
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of recovery by securing a jury trial on both negligence and unseaworthi-
ness theories.100
HENRY DARNELL LEWIS
100 See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.

